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4 International Political Analysis on the Second Committee of Hejaz

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4 Abstract

Early twentieth century the newly created wahhabism kingdom of Saudi Arabia facing islamic sanction from the muslims world after his occupation of two Holy Cities. To convene it and unifying the various muslims mazhabs, he held mutamar alam islami in mecca in 1926. But many Sunnis traditional ulama felt that their aspirations didnt delivered, nor did Dutch East Indiest Ulama in Nusantara. After unable to attend the mutamar, in 1928 they sent Committe of Hejaz cooperating with Egyptians Ulama because of concerns to the plans to ban visits by Muslims of other school of thoughts to Mecca and Medina and they succeeds. Nowadays muslims world facing similar threats of intolerance, at 2014 Saudi wish to relocate the tomb of Prophet Muhammad which trigger old conflicts with wahhabism. This paper was written to demonstrate the importance of the Committee formed to address the possibility of Hijaz conflicts that might arise. This research uses historical approach analysis..

Keywords: Saudi Arabia policy, religious intolerance, committee of Hejaz, Muslims unity

1. Introduction

Within world wide Sunn³ Islam, followers of Wahhabism and other hard-line movements are a distinct minority. It was just such concerned Muslims who first brought world attention to the pernicious actions of Saud³ radicalism and destruction of islamic cultural heritages and decried the Wahhabism as foreign to the toleration contained in Islam and its injunction against coercion in⁸ religion.

The late Abdurrahman Wahid¹, and Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, the Lebanese American Chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America, are two Muslim world leaders who have courageously spoken out and written about the threats posed by Wahhabism and its global expansion². Saudi expert Ali Al-Ahmed, Director of the Washington-based Gulf Institute, published his first evaluation

¹ Former Treasury official David D. Aufhauser, "An Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Terrorism Financing," Statement before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, June 15, 2004, available at <http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=3a5f7334-eadf-402d-b68c-16dc9444043f&WitnessID=adc3200b-5f90-42ec-b335-4c8628e05afd> (accessed July 14, 2016)

² Aya Batrawy. "MECCA-HATTAN: Islam's Holiest City Is Being Overhauled, And People Are Furious." (Business Insider: 2014). Retrieved from: <http://www.businessinsider.com/mecca-is-being-overhauled-and-people-are-furious-2014-10>

3 Saudi textbooks in January 2001. Ali Alyami of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, scholar Sheikh Ahmed Subhy Mansour, and authors Stephen Schwartz and Mai Yamani are among other Muslim leaders and intellectuals who, from outside the Kingdom, write strong and persuasive human rights critiques of Saudi policy.

2. Methods

This paper explores the data collection in qualitative library research. The paper examines Saudi Arabian policies and the current intolerance cases on the country then directing them to the history of world political situation on the 1926 committee of Hejaz and its aiming and success then analyze within the global political situations nowadays.

3. Discussion

3.1 Destruction of Saudi Religious Sites and Wahhabism Intolerance

In Saudi Arabia, The Ministry for Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da'wah, and Guidance, commonly abbreviated to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs (MOIA)³, supervises and regulates religious activities. Whereas the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) directly enforces religious law, the MOIA is responsible for the administration of broader religious services. According to the MOIA, its primary duties include overseeing the coordination of Islamic societies and organizations, the appointment of clergy, and the maintenance and construction of mosques. Yet, despite its official mission to “preserve Islamic values” and protect mosques “in a manner that fits their sacred status,” the MOIA is complicit in a longstanding government campaign against the peninsula’s traditional heritage – Islamic or otherwise.

Since 1925, the Al Saud family has overseen the destruction of tombs, mosques, and historical artifacts in Jeddah, Medina, Mecca, al-Khobar, Awamiyah, and Jabal al-Uhud. According to the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation. Just between 1985 and 2014 through the MOIA’s founding in 1993 the government demolished 98% of the religious and historical sites located in Saudi Arabia.

Historical Timeline Of The Destruction In Hejaz



Source : Hijaz under Ottoman, William Ochsenwald, ohio state university press 1984

Fig 1: Historical Timeline of The Destruction in Hejaz

In Mecca, state-sponsored ‘Islamic development’ has meant the demolition of religious structures to make way for hotels, shopping malls, and cash-dispensing machines⁴. The Grand Mosque expansion is just the largest of many comparable ‘development’ projects at work across the kingdom; taken altogether, these projects represent a broader pattern of creative destruction, targeting some of the oldest and most significant places in

³Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da'wah, and Guidance. “About the Ministry.” (MOIA: 2009). Retrieved from: <http://www.moia.gov.sa/eng/Menu/Pages/About.aspx>

⁴Carla Power, 2014. <https://www.times.com/saudi-arabia-bulldozes-its-heritage>

human history. Moreover, the government has exploited this confluence of religious and financial interests to justify a campaign aimed at the erasure of dissenting heritage sites and the imposition of wider religious uniformity. These concurrent efforts have worked to expunge from the historical record any culture existing prior to Saudi rule. Royal Decree 3/A established the MOIA in 1993 to act “in the service of mosques, developing and sponsoring endowments, propagating Islam, considering Islamic issues, and cooperating with Islamic societies and centers to help Muslims worship Allah.”⁵

Nevertheless, the establishment of the MOIA has apparently had little mitigating effect on the kingdom’s destruction of mosques, tombs, and other heritage sites. As the government has escalated its urban development and expansion campaigns in the wake of the MOIA’s establishment, the latter has widely failed to meet key aspects of its second and fourth objectives. More precisely, it has chosen to disregard nearly all religious, cultural, or historical sites in Saudi Arabia, opting for the narrowest interpretation of its broad mandate to preserve Islamic values and protect mosques.

From 1996 to 2014, and then again from 2015 – almost as long as the MOIA has existed⁶ – Saleh bin Abdul-Aziz Al ash-Sheikh has served as the Minister of Islamic Affairs. The Al ash-Sheikh is one of the most powerful families in Saudi Arabia, tracing its lineage back to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. In addition to his two appointments as Minister of Islamic Affairs, Saleh bin Abdul-Aziz Al ash-Sheikh was also appointed as one of the kingdom’s first muftis (or official Wahhabi religious authorities)⁷. Two of the minister’s relatives have risen even higher in the Wahhabi hierarchy, each being appointed to serve as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia; notably, Abdulaziz ibn Abdullah Al ash-Sheikh, the current Grand Mufti, has allegedly endorsed state-sponsored religious destruction in the past, calling for the demolition of “all the [Christian] churches of the region.”⁸

The near-constant leadership of Saleh bin Abdul-Aziz Al ash Sheikh is only one example of the MOIA’s formal connections to the Wahhabi establishment. More generally, the absence of any institutional separation from this establishment has rendered the MOIA unable to function as an independent government agency. To the contrary, it has functioned as an extension of the political and religious elites, selectively interpreting and applying its mandate to support pre-approved policy, such as destructive state-sponsored development projects.

This arrangement has not entailed a strict commitment to the protection of certain mosques and religious sites, or even a begrudging acquiescence to the king’s direct authority over the two holy shrines⁹. Instead, it has meant a reactive validation of any demolition based on the exigencies of the project at hand.

3.2 Early Destruction

As early as 1926, six years before the official unification of the kingdom, Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Saud (also known as Ibn Saud, the first king

⁵ www.moia.gov.sa/eng/menu/ministrymission.aspx

⁶ The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. “About Saudi Arabia Biographies of Ministers.” 2015 Retrieved from: <http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/Biographies-of-Ministers.aspx>,

⁷ Abdulrahman Yahya Baamir. *Shari'a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi Arabia*. (Ashgate: 2010). Retrieved from: <https://books.google.com/books?id=iur6q4VhWgYC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ *ibid*

of modern Saudi Arabia) razed the holy tombs at the al-Ma'la Cemetery in Mecca¹⁰. The cemetery, which predates Islam, contained the resting places of Abdul Manaf (the Prophet Muhammad's great-great-grandfather), Abdul Muttalib (the Prophet's grandfather), Abu Talib (the Prophet's uncle), and Khadija bint Khuwaylid (the Prophet's first wife).

That same year, Ibn Saud demolished most of the al-Baqi Cemetery in Medina,¹¹ destroying the graves of Ibrahim as (Abraham of the monotheistic faiths), Fatima az-Zahra (the Prophet's daughter),¹⁴ Hasan al Mujtaba and Ali Ibnul Hussain, Mohammed Baqir, Abbas ibn Abd¹⁴-Muttalib (the Prophet's grandsons, great grandsons,¹⁴ uncle and companion), Safiyya bint Abd al-Muttalib (the Prophet's aunt), Aatika bint Abd al-Muttalib (the Prophet's aunt), Umm al-Baneen (Ali ibn Abi Talib's second wife), Ismail ibn Saddiq (an Ismaili Shia Imam), Abdullah ibn Jafar al-Tayyaar (the Prophet's grandson-in-law), Halimah al-Sa'diyya (the Prophet's nurse during his early childhood), and 7,000 other people with supposed ties to the Prophet.¹²

3.3 Grand Mosques Expansion

As the modern Saudi state developed, the heirs of Ibn Saud built on these original efforts sometimes literally. In 1978, for example, the government decided to level the al-Basha Mosque in Harat al-Sham, Jeddah. According to the Jeddah Municipal government, the 18th Century Ottoman structure had "remained unchanged until [that year] when it was demolished and another mosque was built in its place."¹³

In 1989, Saudi authorities removed the body of Abd Allah, the Prophet Muhammad's father, from his burial place at the Prophet's childhood home. Information derived indicates that AbdAllah's remains are now interned at the remnants of the al-Baqi Cemetery. The Prophet's house, however, was destroyed; the authorities reportedly had it bulldozed to accommodate an expansion of the marble plaza outside the Grand Mosque. The government also demolished the home of the Prophet's first wife, Khadija bint Khuwaylid, in 1989, replacing it with a library and a row of toilets for visitors to the¹⁷ and Mosque¹⁴. Almost a decade later, in 1998, the authorities bulldozed and burned the grave of Aminah bint Wahab, the Prophet's mother.

Carla Power of *TIME Magazine* writes that when the authorities finished ceme¹⁷g the crevice, they proceeded to fence off "the base [of Mount Uhud], warning would-be visitors that it was just a mountain, like any other."¹⁵ ¹⁹re recent reports suggest that the government has accelerated the pace of destruction. Ibrahim al-Assaf, the Saudi Minister of Finance, provided a far higher estimate of the necessary destruction in January 2015, identifying upwards of 10,000 properties for demolition¹⁶. ¹¹araphrased in *Al Arabiya*, the MOIA's al-Khatri conceded that only "several of these buildings have been vacated while work is ongoing to vacate the others."¹⁷ Finance Minister al-

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¹⁰ U.S. Department of State. "International Religious Freedom Report for 2013." (U.S. DoS: 2014). pdf

¹¹ ibid

¹²Power. "Saudi Arabia Bulldozes over its Heritage." (TIME: 2014). Retrieved from:<http://time.com/3584585/saudi-arabia-bulldozes-over-its-heritage>

¹³ ibid

¹⁴ ibid

¹⁵ carla power, op cit

¹⁶ ibid

¹⁷ Sami Al-

¹¹ Maghamisi. "126 mosques to be razed in Saudi Arabia for Madinah mosque expansion." (Al Arabiya:

Assaf, for his part, claims that 2,500 of the 10,000 property owners have been reimbursed¹⁸. The Masjid al-Ghamama, where the Prophet reportedly prayed during the last years of his life, will be among the sites slated for demolition. Elsewhere during this same period, it is reported that Saudi authorities destroyed the house of Ali ibn Ali Talib.

The government's destruction of heritage sites began to receive widespread international attention – and became most clearly identified with the processes of commercial urban development – after the late King Abdullah announced a \$21 billion budget plan to modify and expand Mecca's Grand Mosque in 2011¹⁹.

Despite King Abdullah's death in January 2015, these development projects have proceeded apace under his successor, King Salman. *The Huffington Post* reports that by 2017, for example, Mecca will become "home to the world's largest hotel by room count," at the complete expense of the Saudi Ministry of Finance²⁰. Architect Sami Angawi, quoted in *Business Insider*, argues that these projects will just as certainly spell devastation for historical neighborhoods and cultural sites. Referring to the \$15 billion Makkah Royal Clock Tower Hotel project, he states, "The truth of the history of Mecca is wiped out with dynamite. Is this development?"²¹

On September first 2014 the British on-line paper *The Independent* reported on alleged plans by the Saudi Arabian government to demolish the Prophet Muhammad's tomb and move his body to an unmarked grave. *The Independent's* story was based on a 61 page document prepared by Saudi cleric Ali bin Abdulaziz al-Shabal, a faculty member at Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh and an advisor to the committee charged with planning the expansion of the mosque. The British paper suggested that the destruction of the Prophet's tomb might lead to increased Sunni-Shia schoolsarianism. Even the suggestion that the Saudis might demolish the tomb has led to increased schoolsarianism — not between Sunnis and Shia but between the huge majority of Sunni and Shia Muslims, who view it as a sacrilege, and Saudi Wahhabis.

Actually it's an old issue. Before returning to the current scene, the year 2011 that also raises issues been disturbed in the Islamic world. At that time, in addition to questioning the disappearance one by one the relics of the Prophet – the House of the Prophet, Khadijah, Fatimah's House, and so on, even embossed critique of structuring the Government does Saudi Mecca. Irfan al-Alawi, the Director of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation, warned that dismantling of the tomb of the Prophet's intention. To *The Independent* newspaper, Al-Alawi expressed annoyance. 'People want to visit the space where the family of Prophet ever lived,' said he. 'Now all of it will be destroyed because the Government of Saudi Arabia considers it shirk and idolatry practices.' The story quickly went viral and sparked a firestorm of protest in print, in online publications and social media. Ahmed Al-Mansouri, a spokesman the Saudi Presidency of the Two Holy Mosques, stated: "This is the personal opinion of a researcher, who had expressed his views in a study, and it does not reflect the views of the presidency or the Kingdom."

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2014). Retrieved from: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/13/126-mosques-to-be-raised-in-Saudi-Arabia-for-Madinah-mosque-expansion.html>

¹⁸ ibid

¹⁹ Construction Week. "Saudi king launches \$21.3bn Grand Mosque project." (CW: 2011). Retrieved from: <http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-13646-saudi-king-launches-213bn-grand-mosque-project/>

²⁰ ibid

²¹ Aya Batrawy. "MECCA-HATTAN: Islam's Holiest City Is Being Overhauled, And People Are Furious." (Business Insider: 2014). Retrieved from: <http://www.businessinsider.com/mecca-is-being-overhauled-and-people-are-furious-2014-10>

1 Muslims throughout the world doubt the sincerity of this denial because Saudis have a long history of demolishing holy places, especially tombs. When they first conquered Mecca and Medina in 1806, razing tombs and shrines was high on their agenda. Most of these were restored when the Ottomans reclaimed the holy cities in 1813. The Saudis destroyed many of them again when they seized power in 1925. On both occasions, Wahhabi clerics advised destroying the Prophet's tomb.

3.4 Muslims Reactions

Wahhabis and other Salafis are a small minority of the world's Muslim population. Most Muslims, Sunni and Shia alike, think that the veneration of prophets, saints and their tombs is an essential element of Muslim piety and a source of blessing. A survey conducted by the Center of the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University in eight countries outside the Middle East (France, Germany, Indonesia, Malaysia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and the United Kingdom) showed that only 9.6% of respondents accepted the Wahhabi position that it is essential not to visit graves. Wahhabism also teaches that venerating the Prophet Muhammad and celebrating his birthday is forbidden. 82.3% of respondents stated that it is obligatory or desirable. In Indonesia the figures were 2.1% and 96.9% respectively. For most Muslims the thought of destroying the Prophet Muhammad's tomb is so abhorrent it is almost unimaginable.

On September 4th 2014 Indonesian Religious Affairs Minister Lukman Hakim Saifuddin met with Saudi ambassador Mustafa Ibrahim Al-Mubarak seeking clarification about the alleged plan to destroy the Prophet's tomb and to inform him that Indonesian Muslims vigorously oppose it. Al-Mubarak assured him that the reports were false and that the Saudi government is committed to keeping the Prophet's remains in their current location. Statements by the leaders of Indonesia's major Muslim organizations echoed these official concerns.

Indonesian Salafi organizations including *Muhammadiyah* and *Persatuan Islam* were also critical of the Saudi plan even though both strongly oppose tomb veneration. Traditionalists responded to these accusations by a quoting *fatwa* (legal opinion) by the prominent Saudi cleric Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914-1999) who wrote that: "It is obligatory to destroy the Prophet's tomb and remove it from the mosque because the presence of a grave in the Prophet's Mosque is *bid'ah* (prohibited innovation)."²²

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which is Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, issued the strongest condemnation. NU represents the country's Muslim traditionalist for whom the veneration of tombs and devotion to the Prophet Muhammad are essential elements of religious life. NU was founded in 1926 partly in response to the Saudi destruction of tombs and other holy places in Mecca and Medina and rumors that they intended to destroy the Prophet's tomb. Slamet Effendi Yusuf, the chairman of NU's executive council, described the plan as "stupidity" and "ignorance" and stated that NU would be in the vanguard of opposition to it.

3.5 The Committee of Hejaz

The final dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in World War I removed the Ottoman obstacle and created a void, which a number of Muslim leaders and activists rushed to fill by convening Islamic congresses. In each instance, they sought to mark their causes or their ambitions with the stamp of Islamic consensus. Some of the conveners sought wider Muslim support against non-Muslim enemies; others coveted the title of caliph, which they hoped to secure through the acclaim of a Muslim assembly.

²² *monotheism, Tenth Grade*. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Education. Education Development, 1426-1427; 2005-2006, p. 67;

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In 1919, Mustafa Kamal convened an Islamic congress in Anatolia, to mobilize foreign Muslim support for his military campaigns. After his victory, however, Kamal took no further initiatives, and he ultimately severed Turkey from wider Islam by abolishing the caliphate in 1924. During the pilgrimage season of 1924, King Husain bin Ali of the Hejaz summoned a "pilgrimage congress" in Mecca to support his own short-lived claim to the caliphate, but he was driven into exile by Abdu al-Aziz bin Saud, who occupied Mecca and convened his own "world" congress during the pilgrimage season of 1926. This congress, which Abd al-Aziz hoped would confer Islamic sanction upon his administration of the holy cities, instead leveled many criticisms, and he did not reconvene it²³.

At that time, as recorded in history, King Saud applying a policy that is hurting Muslims badly, namely the anti-plurality and also the destruction of historical artefacts and heritage sites of Islamic civilization. Included, one of which was the plan of dismantling of the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad. Outside view of his monolithic scholar religion base, indeed became the main unrest at that time was the threat of 'disconnection' between Muslims and their 'guidance': Prophet Muhammad, because the Historic sites, including the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad, threatened to be demolished.

This to be source of disquiet and anxiety of all Muslims at that time. However, history records, only Muslims from Indonesia--through the Hejaz-Committee-who dare convey objections against the policies of Ibn Saud. KH Hasbullah Abdul Wahab at the moment it seems to have a view that would later become the main historic sites, Saudi Arabia in Mecca, will be capitalized by its rulers.

Indonesia Islamic community like the Islamic world in General, is experiencing shocks with the collapse of the authority of the Sultan of Turkey are considered as Caliph by the Muslim Ummah. It pushes the ruler of Egypt, in 1924, to hold a Congress about the khilafat (Caliphate), who turns out to gain acclaim from all corners of the Islamic world, including the Islamic society of Nusantara archipelago (Indonesia). To welcome that idea in the land of water, the Khilafat Committee was formed, chaired by Wondoamiseno, with members Surjopranoto, h. Fachruddin and KH. A. Wahab Hasbullah. Because Congress in Egypt it was pushed back, the Khilafat Committee turned his attention to the idea of Congress about the same issues raised by King Abd al Aziz ibn Saud, the ruler's Hijaz.

The idea of King ibn Saud that became a major topic in two Islamic Congress in Yogyakarta in 1925 and in Bandung in 1926. However, Procuring in Bandung turned out to only legalize the modernist House meetings a¹² held a month earlier, to attend the Congress of Khilafat in Makkah will be sent HOS. Tjokroaminoto and KH. MAS Mansur, whilst the KH. A Wahab Hasbullah removed. Nevertheless, KH. A. Wahab Hasbullah and ulama pesantren entrusting the proposal to delegates appointed ruler of Saudi Arabia, in order to remain respectful of the prevailing religious tradition there and the teachings of the schools who embraced the Islamic communities. The proposal was rejected by the Modernist House.

Considering how important the issue was, KH. A. Wahab Hasbullah took the initiative to convene its own deliberations on the matter with the opinionated scholars alike. This move gained widespread acceptance among leading scholars enthusiastically.

¹² On January 31, 1926 to coincide with 16 Rajab 1334 held a meeting at the home of KH. A. Wahab Hasbullah in Surabaya, attended by KH. M. Hasyim Asy'ari, KH. M.

²³ Hijaz under ottoman op cit

Bisri Sansuri, KH. R. Asnawi, KH. Mashum, KH. Ridwan, KH. Nawawi, KH. Nahrawi, KH. Abdullah Ubaid, KH. Alwi Abdul Aziz, KHA. Halim, KH. Admin Munthaha, KH. Dahlan Abdul Qohar and KH. Abdullah Faqih.

The meeting produced some important decisions, among them; the first, formalize and establish the Foundation of the Committee to work with the Hejaz delegation sent to meet King ibn Saud. The Committee will send its own delegation to the Congress of Muslims in Mecca (of Caliphate) consisting of KH. A. Wahab Hasbullah and an Egyptian ulama Sheikh Ahmad Ghunaim al-Mishry.

The delegation is tasked to face the King ibn Saud directly to convey its demands so that the teachings of the practices of the four schools remained respected and do the observations so far the rise of Islam is running, especially after the collapse of the authority of Turkey. This delegation is not incorporated in the Congress of Muslims was, as the representative of Indonesia Muslims already exists. The Envoy originally KH, R. Asnawi, but because he missed the ship and not so set off, the objection was submitted via telegram in 1926. Because telegram has yet to get an answer too, finally KH Abdul Wahab Hasbullah went out, in 1928 as a Messenger. Officially the Messengers are,

1. KH Abdul Wahab Hasbullah (Surabaya).
2. Shaykh al-Misri Ghanaim (Egypt)
3. KH. Dahlan Abdul Qohar (Indonesian scholars who study in Makah).



Fig 2 : The copy of committee of Hejaz demands to King Saudi in 1928
Source: museum NU Surabaya

The Committee delegation was received by King ibn Saud in 1928 and gained a positive response from him. King ibn Saud even give an answer in writing, that it may be known by other members of the Committee of the Hijaz. That answer, among others, contains a pledge to guarantee and respect the teachings of the four schools of Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah throughout the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.




Fig 3 : (left) Copy manuskrip Jawaban Raja Abdul Azis bin Saud; (right) translasi surat
Source : MUSEUM NU Surabaya

At 5 it is written above the King Abd Azis bin Saud pledged in the letter that the replies “Adapun yang berkenaan dengan kebebasan orang, maka hal itu adalah merupakan suatu kehormatan, dan alhamdulillah, semua Ummat Islam bebas melakukan urusan mereka, kecuali dalam hal-hal yang diharamkan Allah, dan tidak ada dalil yang menghalalkan perbuatan tersebut, baik dari Al-Qur’an, Sunnah, Mazhab Salaf Salih dan dari pendapat Imam empat Mazhab. Segala hal yang sesuai dengan ketentuan tersebut, kami lakukan dan kami laksanakan, sedang hal-hal yang menyelisihinya, maka tidak boleh taat untuk melakukan perbuatan maksiat kepada Allah Maha Pencipta. Tujuan kita sebenarnya adalah da’wah kepada apa yang dalam Kitabullah dan Sunnah Rasulullah saw dan inilah agama yang kami lakukan kepada Allah. Alhamdulillah kami berjalan sesuai dengan faham ulama Salaf Sahabat Nabi hingga Imam empat Mazhab. Kami memohon kepada Allah se kepada kita semua ke jalan kebaikan dan kebenaran serta hasil yang baik. In jelaskan. Semoga Allah melindungi saudara semua.
Tanda tangan dan stempel

At 10 it is written below the King Abd Azis bin Saud pledged in the letter that the replies “Adapun yang berkenaan dengan kebebasan orang, maka hal itu adalah merupakan suatu kehormatan, dan alhamdulillah, semua Ummat Islam bebas melakukan urusan mereka, kecuali dalam hal-hal yang diharamkan Allah, dan tidak ada dalil yang menghalalkan perbuatan tersebut, baik dari Al-Qur’an, Sunnah, Mazhab Salaf Salih dan dari pendapat Imam empat Mazhab. Segala hal yang sesuai dengan ketentuan tersebut, kami lakukan dan kami laksanakan, sedang hal-hal yang menyelisihinya, maka tidak boleh taat untuk melakukan perbuatan maksiat kepada Allah Maha Pencipta. Tujuan kita sebenarnya adalah da’wah kepada apa yang dalam Kitabullah dan Sunnah Rasulullah saw dan inilah agama yang kami lakukan kepada Allah. Alhamdulillah kami berjalan sesuai dengan faham ulama Salaf Sahabat Nabi hingga Imam empat Mazhab. Kami memohon kepada Allah se kepada kita semua ke jalan kebaikan dan kebenaran serta hasil yang baik. In jelaskan. Semoga Allah melindungi saudara semua.
Tanda tangan dan stempel

It can be concluded that the practice of destruction of the relics and historical places of the companions of the Prophet and the Salaf Salih in Saudi Arabia and practice of intolerance against existing beliefs is not an attitude that is in line with the four priests of the sect as mentioned. The Government of Saudi Arabia who are currently in power should not only inherit the Kingdom from its predecessor, but also virtues and wisdom of King Abd Azis bin Saud to protect and respect the differences of views included with Shia.

3.6 The Relationship Between The Nusantara Archipelago With The Middle East

The relationship between the nusantara archipelago with the Middle East involving such a long history, which can be traced up to the very old time. The earliest

contact between the two areas is particularly associated with the trade. The relationship between both penetrated into the various fields – not just the trade after the rise of Islam in the Middle East. The introduction and spread of Islam on the coast is evident not only trade relations between Middle East with archipelago, but also various forms of relations and exchange of religious, social, political, and cultural.

Entering the end of the 12th century, concurrent with the rise of Islamic kingdoms in the Middle East, as well as the decline of Srivijayan power, muslim merchants began to actively convey the teachings of their religion to the inhabitants of the archipelago.

After the fall of Melaka to the Portuguese, the Sultanate of Aceh appeared taking a share in establishing relationships with the Ottoman Empire. Was the Sultan of Alaudin Riayat Syah al-Kahar (ascended the throne at 943/1537), who realize the needs of Aceh will be a strong ally, i.e. Nice not only to expel the Portuguese from Malacca, but also to expand his reign yourself in other areas, particularly the hinterland, in Sumatra.

Relationship between Nusantara and kingdoms of the Middle East is not limited to the Ottoman Dynasty. Aceh, for example, has also strained relations with Islamic religious center, i.e., Makkah and Madinah. Although this relationship is more political than religious in nature. New Java held a relationship with Haramain since the establishment of the Kingdom of Demak on the 16th century. As a further step to develop an attitude of keberislaman, while you perform Hajj, a Royal representative seeking information about Islam in the land of Haromain. Often times, the Kingdom's relationship with the Haromain through the mail.

Zamakhsyari Dhofier, citing research Anthony Jons, stated that at the beginning of the 17th century the Archipelago send each other letters with magnifying Makkah-Madinah – when it overpowered by the clan Hasyimiyah until the fall of Sharif Husayn 1916 M to Saud Clan-for strengthening relations and introduced Islam to the new entrance to Java. The Arabs alone, the average merchant, has been previously know the State of Java and Malay – famous for its spices and then call the rest of the area with 'Java'.

People of Javanese (Nusantara) itself, generally goes to Makkah – Medina just to perform the pilgrimage. In Haromain, they are notable as people who are honest and sincere. Usually, the person sepuh (elders) Java (Nusantara) prefer to spend his days in Mecca to worship. the youth Are began to form a study group by Snouck Hurgronje referred to the 'colony of Java' (Jamaat al-Jawiyyin). To carry out investigations, they formed the forum of Arab language teaching with the Malay language in the Grand Mosque led by a teacher as a provision to follow study of the scholars of Haromain.

The name Javanese Colony sounds to the motherland, to the many alumni of boarding school (students) in ground water that flocked to the Holy land to join the Colony of Java. The name of the Javanese colony increasingly globalizing because influential scholars gives birth to a range of Sheikh al-Nawawi, Shaykh Ahmad Arsyad al-Banjari, Sheikh Ahmad Khotib Sambas, To Kyai Mahfouz Termas. In addition, the condition of the Holy land gave security guarantees for the students of pressing impeialis Netherlands supports the quality of their thinking. Until then, resulting in a network of cooperation between the homeland and the Holy land. some of the scholars

Archipelago there is a decided settled in Haramain. There is also a feeling that science hasn't gotten adequ¹³, to then continue his intellectual expeditions to Al-Azhar University of Cairo, Egypt. Muhammad Arsyad along Sayyid Abd al-Shamad bin Abd al-Rahman al-Jawi al-Palimbani, Abd al-Rahman al-Batawi, and Abd al-Wahab al-Ashhab Bugisi is part of an initial al-Jawiyyin increase of pursuing islamic science in Cairo. The development of a network between the archipelago and the Middle East continue to be maintained and the development in the quantity and quality is continuously performed. Not

only focused on Mecca and Cairo, the Middle East's network which extends to Central Asia and its surrounding areas that make the first Committee of Hijaz met the success.

3.7 PBNU : It is the time to form the Second Committee of Hejaz

Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama as the ' owner ' of the history Committee of the Hijaz was the legitimate heir to the historical meaning is felt essential to bringing back the possibility of forming a Committee of Hijaz II. Helmy f. Zaini former Secretary General of NU NU says it has an obligation to not only preserve the results of the Committee of the hijaz, but also the first repeat and pass it on. Steps form the Committee of Hijaz II has at least two main reasons.

First, responding to capitalization the pilgrimage which is reflected in the development area around the Kaaba that tend to reduce the value of philosophical ketawadhuan pilgrimage. And second, diplomacy to prevent all efforts in order to further destruction of historical artifacts in Makkah and Medina. Two of the above are the two main things in addition to other things, such as, improved governance and management systems for Hajj. series of reasons above is considered more than enough to be used as a foundation and reference point in order to form a Committee of Hijaz II led by PBNU as have been done on 90 years ago.

3.8 the Second Committee of hijaz as projection of muslim unity?

Muslim leaders from around the world called on Sunni and Shia followers to unite against all obstacles and reside all differences. Facing the massive destruction of the holly cities its worth to think that we should unite against the Saudi intolerance policy for the sake of the muslim world, but not against the country itself. But as we knows the conditions of the muslim world. The Houthi surge in Yemen triggered a response from several Sunni states. Saudi Arabia mobilized a 10-nation coalition of predominantly Arab countries for an air campaign and naval blockade against the Houthis. Turkey responded with a strong and unprecedented criticism of Iran for Tehran's support for the Houthis. Even Pakistan, which is outside the Middle East, got dragged into the conflict, though its role is still undefined. All of this activity from a diverse group of states whose populations are mostly Sunni created clamor about the emergence of a Sunni bloc. Yemen is the newest battleground in the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two regional and schoolsarian rivals. With the Saudis leading a military intervention in Yemen against the Iranian-supported Houthi movement, there has been much talk of a Sunni camp mobilizing to counter the threat posed by ascendant Shiite forces. However, competing interests will hobble the fledgling Sunni alliance.

- Competing interests will keep a Sunni camp from coalescing.
- Saudi Arabia and Turkey are at odds with each other over the future of the Arab world.
- Pakistan is far removed from the Middle East and does not feel close sectarian ties to Saudi Arabia.
- The Saudi-led coalition acting in Yemen is more an Arab grouping than a Sunni bloc, and differences exist even among the Arabs.

The conflict in Yemen certainly has increased the geopolitical schoolsarian polarization in the region that was triggered by the rise of a government dominated by Shiites in Iraq in the mid-2000s and exacerbated by Syria's civil war. But the idea that Iran's attempt to expand its influence in the Arabian Peninsula has led the region's Sunnis to close ranks against Tehran and its allies is incorrect. The outcome of the Saudi-led effort to mobilize Sunni nations reveals great divisions between those countries.

In Turkey, the most powerful Sunni nation in the region, President Recep Ta 16 p Erdogan harshly criticized Iran's support for the Houthis i 16 te March. Erdogan said Iran is attempting to dominate the region, and in doing so is "annoying us, Saudi Arabia and

the Gulf countries¹⁶." He called the situation intolerable and asked Iran to withdraw whatever forces it has in Yemen, Syria and Iraq.

However, Turkey has not committed any forces to the war in Yemen. It does not make sense for the Turks to be part of a Saudi-led coalition when Ankara desires regional leadership. The Saudis would like to see the Turks join the Saudi initiative, but they are wary of Turkish ambitions. After all, the Saudi polity emerged in the mid-18th century in opposition to Turkish domination over the Arab lands. Even if Turkey had not declined to participate, the Saudis and other Arab actors are not comfortable with the idea of aligning with Turkey; doing so would give Ankara the opportunity to dominate the region. The Arabs want Turkish help to counter Iran but do not want to facilitate Turkey's aspirations.

Moreover, there is great dissonance between the Turkish and Saudi visions of the future of the region. Turkey wants to recreate the Arab world in its own image, which is why it supports Muslim Brotherhood-type groups. For Saudi Arabia, political Islam and democratization are a lethal mix. That said, when it comes to Iran — specifically, conflicts such as those in Syria and Iraq, where the interests of Riyadh and Ankara align to an extent — the two can benefit from tactical-level cooperation.

The Iran-backed government in Syria is preventing Turkey from expanding its influence in the Arab world. Consequently, Ankara, which has been cooperating with Doha in Syria, is now coordinating with Riyadh, explaining, in part, the rebels' recent gains against Damascus. Likewise, the Saudis need to work with Turkey to topple the Syrian government and eliminate a major element enabling Iranian penetration of the Arab world. Yet their varying goals will make future competition between the Turks and the Saudis inevitable.

Unlike Turkey, Pakistan's conventional power is relatively weak. It is geographically removed from the Middle East and has no ambitions to lead the region. However, Saudi Arabia's relations with Pakistan are also problematic, even though the Pakistanis and Saudis historically have been close allies. Riyadh has been a great source of financial and energy assistance for Islamabad during Pakistan's long-standing dire economic conditions. The Pakistanis have provided military support for the Saudis, both in terms of the kingdom's security and its interests in the region. Moreover, their intelligence services have cooperated closely — first in the efforts to support Islamist insurgents in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s and then in the fight against jihadists over the past decade.

thus, the much talked about Sunni camp is really an Arab camp. But Saudi Arabia and certain Gulf Cooperation Council states are doing the heavy lifting in Yemen because the three major Arab states — Egypt, Syria and Iraq — have lost strategic relevance since the 1970s. Egypt's attempts at regional leadership foundered when wars, intra-Arab competition and a structurally weak economy led to the decline of the Nasserite government. In Syria, the minority Alawite schools in Syria's Baathist government under President Hafez al Assad consolidated power and, along with Damascus' rivalry with Baghdad, took the Levantine country out of both the Sunni and Arab categories. The 19²⁵ Gulf War weakened Iraq as a Sunni Arab state. The country later fell ¹⁶to Iran's orbit after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.²⁴

While the Shia protests were initially inspired by the Arab Spring, they were focused less on democracy per se than on demanding better treatment of Shia. That was

²⁴ Abd. Salam, *memahami politik timur tengah*, 2003. Pustaka Ilmu, Yogyakarta

6 initially a distinction with little real difference, but Saudi security forces cracked down on the protes 6, "leading parts of the movement to turn toward militancy,"

Saudi Arabia's now months-long war in Yemen, where Saudi and allied forces are bombing a Shia insurgency that has taken over the government. Saudi Arabia — which views Yemen as its backyard, sort of how Russia views Ukraine — is convinced the insurgents are Iranian puppets.

The political state of Islamic countries of the Middle East whose inhabitants still chaos due to ISIS and also domestic situation that less stable undermines the occurrence of unity and commonality of view. The situation in Islamic countries outside the Middle East are more stable, such as Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, but the support of allied countries to Saudi Arabia must also be taken into account.

4. Conclusion

There are hundreds millions of muslims living in different countries, different continents. They belong to hundreds of different cultures. In fact, the number of Muslims in the universe has reached 1.57 billion 26 inhabitants. In the quantity of Muslims is so great. According to data release of The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, one out of four inhabitants of the Earth is Muslims. the majority of Muslims are scattered in countries lagging behind and growing poverty and ignorance are still heavily indebted.

Moreover the Muslims of the world are scattered and experienced schisms. Every Muslim country tend to compete for influence. Moreover, at this time, the Muslim countries in the Middle East and Central Africa face problems in the strange country. Massive demo struck a number of Muslim countries. Palestinians still hold Israel was colonized. As long as unable to unite the Islamic civilization, it is difficult to rise. This is one of the challenges faced by the Muslims. Islam is calling for raising the dialogue, understanding and cooperation between Nations for the benefit of humanity.

Hijaz is a special region in the opinion of Muslims, the region does not only belong to Saudi Arabia, so the management and the situation will also be a concern of Muslims. The destruction of the relics and historical places of the companions of the Prophet and the Salaf Salih in Saudi Arabia and practice of intolerance against existing beliefs is not an attitude that is in line with the four priests of the sect as mentioned in the letter of King Abd Azis bin Saud to the Committee of Hejaz. If the kingdom of Arabia continued the practice of destruction of the historical Holy places and without any apparent reason and the existence of human rights violations without listening to the appeal and advice from fellow Islamic countries, it is not impossible the second committees hijaz will be formed in the future

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